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Abstract—We examine the effect of oil price fluctuations on democratic
institutions over the 1960–2007 period. We also exploit the very persis-
tent response of income to oil price fluctuations to study the effect of
persistent (oil-price-driven) income shocks on democracy. Our results
indicate that countries with greater net oil exports over GDP see improve-
ments in democratic institutions following upturns in international oil
prices. We estimate that a 1 percentage point increase in per capita GDP
growth due to a positive oil price shock increases the Polity democracy
score by around 0.2 percentage points on impact and by around 2 percen-
tage points in the long run. The effect on the probability of a democratic
transition is around 0.4 percentage points.
I. Introduction
THE effect of natural resource wealth and income onpolitical institutions is a central issue at the intersection
of economics and political sciences. We contribute to this
research by examining the effect of international oil price
fluctuations on democratic institutions over the 1960–2007
period. We also exploit the very persistent response of
aggregate income to oil prices to study the effect of persis-
tent (oil-price-driven) income shocks on democracy. Our
results indicate that countries with greater net oil exports
over GDP see improvements in democratic institutions fol-
lowing upturns in international oil prices. For example,
positive oil price shocks lead to improvements in the Polity
democracy score, as well as the subscores for executive
constraints, executive recruitment, and political competi-
tion, and a higher probability of a democratic transition. We
estimate that an oil-price-driven 1 percentage point increase
in per capita GDP growth increases the Polity democracy
score by around 0.2 percentage points on impact and by
around 2 percentage points in the long run. The effect on
the probability of a democratic transition is around 0.4 per-
centage points.
Our work relates to the literature on the link between
political institutions and natural resource wealth and
income. An influential early contribution is Lipset (1959),
who documents that high-income countries tend to be more
democratic. He argues that this positive correlation arises
because higher per capita income is a symptom of the mod-
ernization of society and that modernization also increases
citizens’ demand for political participation. The positive
association between income and democracy has also been
emphasized by Huntington (1991), who holds that higher
per capita income was one of the key factors behind the
so-called third wave of democratization, and by Przeworski
et al. (2000), who argue that higher per capita income averts
autocratic reversals. (For further evidence on the positive
association between income and democracy, see Barro,
1999; Boix & Stokes, 2003; Epstein et al., 2006; Glaeser,
Ponzetto, & Shleifer, 2007; and Papaioannou and Siourou-
nis, 2008a. Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2009) focus on the
within-country association between income and democracy
using a panel data approach with country-specific fixed
effects. This approach has the advantage of accounting for
all fixed country characteristics that may affect both income
and political institutions. Acemoglu et al. find no associa-
tion between income and democracy once country-specific
fixed effects are accounted for.
As is well understood, income fluctuations are driven by
transitory shocks like monetary policy or rainfall shocks, as
well as permanent shocks like technology or oil price
shocks (Hamilton, 1994). The literature on the determinants
of democracy suggests that it may be important to distin-
guish between the effects of transitory income shocks on
democratic institutions and the effects of permanent income
shocks. For example, Lipset’s modernization hypothesis is
probably best interpreted as a positive response of demo-
cratic institutions to permanent increases in income. On the
other hand, Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2001, 2006) theory
of political transition yields that transitory positive income
shocks may decrease the probability of a democratic transi-
tion. It is therefore interesting to ask how the effects of tran-
sitory and permanent income shocks on democracy can be
distinguished empirically. One approach is to focus on dif-
ferent sources of income shocks.1 For example, Bru¨ckner
and Ciccone (2011) exploit within-country variation in rain-
fall as a source of transitory shocks to aggregate income in
sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, the response of
aggregate income to oil-prices is very persistent, and the
response of democratic institutions to oil-price-driven in-
come shocks is therefore better thought of as the response
of democracy to permanent income shocks.2
The literature on oil and democracy is closely related to
the political science and economics literature on the effect
of natural resources on political institutions and long-term
growth (see Van der Ploeg, 2011, for a review). An impor-
tant strand of this literature argues that natural resource
abundance leads to less democratic institutions (Hun-
tington, 1991; Karl, 1997). Several empirical studies have
found that the cross-country association between indicatorsReceived for publication March 18, 2010. Revision accepted for publi-
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1 Another approach is to examine the within-country association
between income and democracy over different time spans. For example,
Acemoglu et al. (2009) look at the year-to-year association, the associa-
tion over 5-year time spans, and the association over 25-year time spans.
2 Ciccone (2008, 2011a, 2011b) discusses estimation of the effects of
transitory and permanent income shocks in more detail.
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of oil wealth and political institutions is consistent with this
argument (see Ross, 2001, 2009; Collier & Hoeffler, 2009;
Ramsey, 2009; and Tsui, 2011, for example). For studies
that question the negative cross-sectional relationship
between natural resources, on the one hand, and institutions
and long-term growth, on the other, see Stijns (2006) and
Alexeev and Conrad (2009). There are also studies of the
within-country association between oil income and political
institutions.3 Haber and Menaldo (2011) examine the rela-
tionship between several measures of oil income and
democracy going back as far as 1861. Their approach
exploits the variation of oil prices as well as changes in oil
production. Their main finding is that if anything, the data
point to a positive rather than a negative effect of oil
income on democracy. Wacziarg (2009) studies the time-
series relationship between international oil prices and
democratic institutions. This approach has the advantage of
not relying on changes in oil production, which are endo-
genous and may respond to factors that also affect political
institutions. Wacziarg finds a positive relationship between
oil prices and democracy in OPEC countries but no link in
his full sample. Our analysis differs from Wacziarg’s in that
we study the effect of international oil prices on democracy
by examining the interaction between net oil exports over
GDP and changes in oil prices over time. This approach
allows us to control for common time effects to capture glo-
bal factors like the end of the Cold War or the world busi-
ness cycle that may affect both oil prices and democracy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II describes the data. Section III presents the estimating
equations and section IV our main empirical results. Sec-
tion V concludes.
II. Data
Annual data on international oil prices for the 1960–2007
period are from the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development Commodity Statistics (UNCTAD, 2009).
Figure 1 graphs the evolution of the oil price level over the
1960–2007 period. The figure suggests that international oil
price fluctuations are persistent. This is confirmed by sev-
eral econometric diagnostics. For example, an AR(1)
regression using the natural logarithm (ln) of the interna-
tional oil price yields an autoregression coefficient of 0.99
when controlling for a quadratic trend and an autoregres-
sion coefficient of 1.00 when controlling for a linear trend.
Moreover, the augmented Dickey-Fuller test does not reject
the hypothesis of a unit root in oil price levels at the 90%
confidence level (but rejects the hypothesis of a unit root in
the first-differenced oil price at the 99% confidence level).
The Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) test rejects the stationarity
of oil price levels at the 95% confidence level (but does not
reject the stationarity of the first-differenced oil price at the
90% confidence level).4 And the Andrews and Zivot (1992)
test, which allows for a structural break in the mean and the
trend of oil price levels, fails to reject the hypothesis of a
unit root in oil price levels at the 90% confidence level (but
rejects the hypothesis of a unit root in the first-differenced
oil price at the 99% confidence level). We therefore proceed
under the assumption that there is a unit root in interna-
tional oil prices but that first-differenced oil prices are
stationary.
If there is a unit root in international oil prices, the
change in oil prices over time corresponds to oil price
shocks. Our indicator of the economic impact of interna-
tional oil price shocks in country c is
OilPriceShockc;t ¼ hcD lnOilPricet; ð1Þ
where hc is oil exports minus oil imports relative to GDP
over the whole time period considered or at some point in
time, and D ln OilPricet is the ln-change in international oil
prices over time. This formulation captures that the impact
of international oil price shocks should be greater in coun-
tries with greater net oil exports over GDP. The data on oil
exports and oil imports are from the NBER–United Nations
Trade Database (Feenstra et al., 2004). The cross-country
maximum (minimum) of hc calculated over the 1960–2007
period is 0.18 (0.03), and the cross-country mean
(median) is 0.009 (0.001).
Our main measure of democracy is the revised combined
Polity score (Polity2) from the Polity IV database (Marshall &
Jaggers, 2009). This score is based on subscores for con-
straints on the chief executive, the competitiveness of poli-
FIGURE 1.—TIME SERIES PLOT OF THE OIL PRICE, 1960–2007
3 For example, Burke and Leigh (2010) examine the within-country
association between commodity prices and year-to-year rainfall variation,
on the one hand, and democratic institutions, on the other. Caselli and
Tesei (2010) focus on the heterogeneous response of political institutions
in democracies and autocracies to commodity price shocks and also study
differences in the response among autocracies. For within-country results
on natural resources and growth and human capital accumulation, see
Stijns (2006).
4 The kernel bandwidth in the Kwiatkowski et al. test is based on the
Newey and West (1994) automated bandwidth selection criteria and set
equal to 5.
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tical participation, and the openness and competitiveness of
executive recruitment. The Polity2 score ranges from 10
to þ10. Higher values denote more democratic institutions.
The Polity IV project also provides the subscores for con-
straints on the executive, political competition, and execu-
tive recruitment. The executive constraints subscore mea-
sures the extent of institutional constraints on the decision-
making powers of chief executives. The score ranges from
1 to 7, with higher values denoting stronger executive con-
straints. The political competition score measures the
degree of institutionalization of political competition and
the extent of government restriction on political competi-
tion. This score ranges from 1 to 10, with greater values
denoting more political competition. The openness and
competitiveness of the executive recruitment score measure
the ways in which social superordinates come to occupy
their positions of political authority. The score ranges from
1 to 8, with greater values indicating more open and compe-
titive executive recruitment.5 The Polity IV project codes
times of interregnum (anarchy) as a Polity2 score of 0. This
coding rule may give a misleading picture of progress
toward democracy as autocracies with negative Polity2
scores that fall into anarchy improve their Polity2 scores.
Moreover, the Polity2 score is interpolated during multiyear
transitions following an interregnum (anarchy) period. To
deal with these coding issues and also ensure comparability
between the Polity2 score and the Polity subscores (which
are missing for interregnum periods), our baseline results
exclude country-years that correspond to interregnum peri-
ods or transition periods associated with interregnum. But
we also examine results for Polity2 with interregnum and
transition periods and results based on the Polity IV
Regtrans variable, a discrete version of the Polity2 variable.
We also construct a democratic transition indicator that
takes the value of 1 in year t if the country is a democracy
in year t but was an autocracy in year t  1, and an auto-
cratic reversal indicator that takes the value of 1 in year t if
the country is an autocracy in year t but was a democracy in
year t  1. Following the Polity IV project, countries are
coded as democracies if their Polity2 score is strictly posi-
tive; otherwise countries are coded as autocracies.6 Table 1
provides some summary statistics of our measures of
democracy.
III. Estimation
Our main reduced-form equation relates changes in coun-
tries’ democracy score between t  1 and t DDemocc,t to
the oil price shock in equation (1),
DDemocc;t ¼ ac þ bt þ d OilPriceShockc;t þ ec;t ð2Þ
where ac and bt are country and year fixed effects, d the
main coefficient of interest, and ec,t an error term that is
clustered at the country level. The method of estimation is
least squares. To examine whether oil price shocks induce a
change in countries’ democratic institutions through per
capita GDP growth D lnGDPc;t, we estimate
DDemocc;t ¼ ac þ bt þ dD lnGDPc;t þ ec;t; ð3Þ
where ac and bt are country and year fixed effects, d the
main coefficient of interest; ec,t an error term that is clus-
tered at the country level, and GDP growth is instrumented
by oil price shocks. The method of estimation is two-stage
least squares. The implicit exclusion restriction is that oil
price shocks affect democracy exclusively through per
capita GDP.
IV. Main Results
A. Reduced-Form Estimates
Table 2 presents the reduced-form effect of oil price
shocks on our main measures of democratic institutions.
Column 1 shows that a positive oil price shock in period t
leads to a statistically significant increase in the Polity2
score. Oil price shocks in period t  1 and t  2 enter also
with a positive coefficient, but the effects are less precisely
estimated. In column 2, we find that the average annual oil
price shock between t and t  2 has a statistically signifi-
TABLE 1.—SUMMARY STATISTICS OF POLITY MEASURES
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Number of
Observations
Revised combined polity score (Polity2) 0.40 7.59 10 10 4,782
Executive constraints (Exconst) 3.99 2.36 1 7 4,782
Executive recruitment (Exrec) 5.48 2.40 1 8 4,782
Political competition (Polcomp) 5.20 3.73 1 10 4,782
Polity2 including interregnum 0.38 7.45 10 10 5,020
Transition to democracy indicator 0.03 0.18 0 1 2,649
Transition to autocracy indicator 0.02 0.16 0 1 2,371
Regime transition indicator (Regtrans) 0.01 0.20 1 1 5,020
5 The sample correlation of the within-country change in the executive
constraints and political competition (executive recruitment) score is 0.63
(0.70). The sample correlation of the within-country change in the politi-
cal competition and executive recruitment score is 0.63.
6 We also examined results for democratic transition and autocratic
reversal indicators that treat interregnum periods as missing observations.
This did not affect our main results.
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cant positive effect on the Polity2 score. Figure 2 graphs
the oil price and the Polity2 score for some countries that fit
the pattern of the panel regressions. The reduced-form
effect of oil price shocks on the Polity subscores for execu-
tive constraints, executive recruitment, and political compe-
tition is presented in columns 3 to 8. While the timing
is different across subscores, all statistically significant
effects point to a positive effect of oil price shocks on
democratic institutions. The table also shows results for the
three-year oil price shock defined as in equation (1) with
the ln-change in oil prices between t and t  3. The effect
of a positive oil price shock on democracy is positive and
statistically significant for all scores except executive con-
straints. The size of the effect on the Polity2 score implies
that a 10 percentage point increase in international oil
prices increases the Polity2 score on impact by around
0.012 points for every 10 percentage point increase in net
oil over GDP. This increase in the Polity2 score is approxi-
mately 0.06 percentage points of its range (which goes from
10 to þ10).
Table 3 allows for slow adjustment of democratic institu-
tions to three-year oil price shocks by including the lagged
Polity2 score as an additional explanatory variable. The
method of estimation is least squares or system-GMM esti-
mation (Blundell & Bond, 1998). The results indicate that
the Polity2 score adjusts very slowly to shocks and that the
long-run effect of a shock on the Polity2 score is around 10
times the effect on impact.7 The long-run effect of the oil
TABLE 2.—OIL PRICE SHOCKS AND DEMOCRACY
DPolity2 DExconst DExrec DPolcomp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Oil price shock, t 1.26** 0.52*** 0.10 0.75***
(2.51) (2.79) (0.23) (2.80)
Oil price shock, t  1 1.25* 0.31 0.43** 0.80***
(1.83) (0.86) (2.40) (2.69)
Oil price shock, t  2 1.14 0.03 0.51** 0.83**
(1.48) (-0.08) (2.08) (2.47)
3-year oil price shock 1.22** 0.26 0.35** 0.79***
(2.49) (1.31) (2.24) (3.45)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,782 4,782 4,782 4,782 4,782 4,782 4,782 4,782
The method of estimation is least squares; t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the change
in the Polity2 score; columns 3 and 4, the change in the executive constraints score; columns 5 and 6, the change in the executive recruitment score; and columns 7 and 8, the change in the political competition score.
The three-year oil price shock is defined as in equation (1) in the main text with the ln-change in oil prices between t and t  3. *Significantly different from 0 at 90% confidence, ** 95% confidence, *** 99% confi-
dence.
FIGURE 2.—TIME SERIES PLOT OF THE OIL PRICE AND POLITY CHANGE
7 The long-run adjustment can be obtained as the adjustment on impact
multiplied by the inverse of the coefficient on lagged Polity2 multiplied
by 1.
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price shock on the Polity2 score implies that a 10 percen-
tage point increase in international oil prices increases the
Polity2 score on impact by around 0.9 percentage points of
its range for every 10 percentage point increase in net oil
over GDP.
Table 4 indicates that positive oil price shocks have a sta-
tistically significant, positive and persistent effect on pur-
chasing-power-parity GDP per capita growth from the Penn
World Tables.8 Columns 1 and 2 show that the effect is sta-
tistically significant on impact. The size of the effect
implies that a 10 percentage point increase in international
oil prices increases per capita GDP growth by around 1 per-
centage point for every 10 percentage point increase in net
oil over GDP. Columns 3 and 4 show that the effect remains
statistically significant after three years and that the strength
of the effect is very similar to the effect on impact. Col-
umns 5 and 6 show that the effect is also statistically signifi-
cant after five years and that the strength of the effect con-
tinues to be similar to the effect on impact. The effect of oil
price shocks on GDP growth over ten years remains statisti-
cally significant and is about two-thirds of the effect on
impact. Table 5 contains analogous results for the Polity2
score. Columns 1 and 2 show the effect on impact. The size
of the effect implies that a 10 percentage point increase in
international oil prices increases the Polity2 score by
around 0.017 percentage points of its range for every 10
percentage point increase in net oil over GDP. Columns 3
and 4 show that the effect remains statistically significant
after three years and is around three times stronger than the
effect on impact. The effect after five and ten years is still
statistically significant and similar to the effect after three
years.
B. Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates
Table 6, panel A presents two-stage least squares esti-
mates that use oil price shocks as an instrumental variable
for real per capita GDP growth. The specifications are ana-
logous to the reduced-form specifications in table 3 in all
other regards.9 We find positive and statistically significant
effects on the Polity2 score as well as the subscores for
executive constraints, executive recruitment, and political
TABLE 4.—PERSISTENT EFFECTS OF OIL PRICE SHOCKS ON GDP
DLnGDP
Effect on
GDP on Impact
(t? t)
Effect on GDP
after Three Years
(t  3? t)
Effect on GDP
after Five Years
(t  5? t)
Effect on GDP
after Ten Years
(t  10? t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LS GMM LS GMM LS GMM LS GMM
Oil price shock 0.96*** 0.94*** 0.95*** 0.91*** 1.00*** 0.99*** 0.64** 0.65**
(4.73) (4.90) (5.82) (4.96) (5.32) (5.01) (2.25) (2.60)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 4,782 4,782 4,625 4,625 4,409 4,409 3,829 3,829
The method of estimation in columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 is least squares; columns 2, 4, 6, and 8, system-GMM. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at the country
level. The dependent variable is the ln-change in real per capita GDP. Columns 1 and 2 show the effect of an oil price shock in year t on the ln-change in GDP between year t  1 and t, controlling for the level of real
per capita GDP in year t  1. Columns 3 and 4 show the effect of an oil price shock in year t  3 on the ln-change in GDP between year t  4 and t, controlling for the level of real per capita GDP in year t  4. Col-
umns 5 and 6 show the effect of an oil price shock in year t  5 on the ln-change in GDP between year t  6 and t, controlling for the level of real per capita GDP in year t  6. Columns 7 and 8 show the effect of an
oil price shock in year t  10 on the ln-change in GDP between year t  11 and t, controlling for the level of real per capita GDP in year t  11. Significantly different from 0 at *90%, **95%, ***99%.
TABLE 3.—OIL PRICE SHOCKS, DEMOCRACY, AND POLITY CONVERGENCE
DPolity2 DExconst DExrec DPolcomp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LS GMM LS GMM LS GMM LS GMM
3-year oil price shock 1.67*** 1.70*** 0.42** 0.36* 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.99*** 0.96***
(3.22) (2.93) (2.08) (1.74) (3.00) (2.87) (3.96) (3.21)
Lagged democracy (Level) 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 0.07** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09***
(-8.98) (3.12) (9.43) (2.27) (9.62) (3.40) (8.86) (3.21)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,782 4,782 4,782 4,782 4,782 4,782 4,782 4,782
The method of estimation in columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 is least squares; columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 system-GMM (Blundell & Bond, 1998). t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on Huber-robust standard errors that
are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the change in the Polity2 score; columns 3 and 4, the change in the executive constraints score; columns 5 and 6, the change in the
executive recruitment score; and columns 7 and 8, the change in the political competition score. The p-value on the Hansen J-test (AR2 test) of the overidentifying restrictions for the system-GMM estimation in col-
umn 2 is 0.97 (0.52), column 4, 0.77 (0.49); column 6, 0.67 (0.25); and column 8, 0.99 (0.90). The three-year oil price shock is defined as in equation (1) in the main text with the ln-change in oil prices between t and
t  3. Lagged democracy refers to the Polity2 score at t  1 in columns 1 and 2 and to the relevant Polity subscore at t  1 in columns 38. Significantly different from 0 at *90% confidence, **95% confidence,
***99% confidence.
8 For information on the Penn World Tables GDP data see Heston,
Summers, and Aten (2009).
9 All two-stage least squares regressions control for country and year
fixed effects as well as the lagged democracy score (estimates are not
reported). System-GMM results continue to be very similar to least
squares results (see tables 3–5) and are therefore no longer reported.
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competition. The point estimate implies that a 1 percentage
point increase in per capita GDP leads to an increase in the
Polity2 score of 0.22 percentage points of its range on
impact. The impact response of the Polity subscores for
executive constraints and executive recruitment corre-
sponds to 0.16 percentage points of their respective ranges
and the response of the political competition subscore to
0.26 percentage points of its range.10 The coefficient esti-
mates and significance levels on the lagged democracy
scores are very similar to those in table 3, and the implied
long-run effects therefore continue to be around ten times
the impact effects. Hence, the long-run effect of a 1 percen-
tage point increase in per capita GDP is an increase in the
Polity2 score of 2.2 percentage points of its range. The table
also reports the first-stage F-statistic; the statistic is around
45, substantially above the threshold of 10 recommended
by Staiger and Stock (1997), which indicates that weak
instruments should not be an important concern.
Table 6, panel B reports least squares estimates of the
effect of per capita GDP on democracy. Least squares esti-
mates are positive but smaller than two-stage least squares
estimates and statistically insignificant in most cases. This
might be due to measurement error in GDP growth (Heston,
1994; Deaton, 2005; Johnson et al., 2009). If measurement
error is classical and unrelated to oil price shocks, least
squares estimates would be biased toward 0, but two-stage
least squares estimates would be unaffected. Least squares
estimates could also be smaller because they end up captur-
ing the effect of a GDP shock with average persistence, as
GDP is subject to permanent as well as transitory shocks.11
On the other hand, two-stage least squares estimates using
oil price shocks as an instrument capture the effect of very
persistent GDP shocks. There could also be other reasons
for the discrepancy between least squares estimates and
two-stage least squares estimates. For example, oil-price-
driven income shocks might have stronger effects on gov-
ernment tax revenues or the interpersonal income distribu-
tion than other shocks to GDP.
Tables 7 and 8 implement tests of the overidentifying
restriction that oil price shocks affect democracy only
through GDP. The approach in table 7 uses lagged GDP per
capita levels as an additional instrument for GDP growth.
Lagged GDP levels can be used as an additional instrument
if they affect democratic institutions only through GDP
growth. Table 7, panel A reports the joint F-statistic for the
first-stage effect of oil price shocks and lagged GDP levels
on GDP growth, which indicates that weak instruments
TABLE 6.—OIL PRICE SHOCKS, INCOME, AND DEMOCRACY
DPolity2 DExconst DExrec DPolcomp
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Oil
Price Shocks on Democracy through GDP
DLnGDP 4.39*** 1.10** 1.31*** 2.59***
(3.27) (2.09) (3.10) (3.94)
First-stage F-statistic 45 45 45 45
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 4,782 4,782 4,782 4,782
B: OLS Estimates of the Effect That GDP
Has on Democracy
DLnGDP 0.38 0.21** 0.07 0.13
(1.43) (2.17) (0.67) (1.05)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 4,782 4,782 4,782 4,782
The method of estimation in panel A is two-stage least squares; panel B, least squares. t-statistics
shown in parentheses are based on Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level.
The instrumental variable in panel A is the three-year oil price shock defined as in equation (1) with the
ln-change in oil prices between t and t  3. The dependent variable in column 1 is the change in
the Polity2 score; column 2, the change in the executive constraints score; column 3, the change in the
executive recruitment score; and column 4, the change in the political competition score. The specifica-
tion in column 1 controls for the Polity2 score at t  1, and the specifications in columns 2–4 for the rele-
vant Polity subscore at t  1. Significantly different from 0 at *90%, **95%, ***99%.
TABLE 5.—PERSISTENT EFFECTS OF OIL PRICE SHOCKS ON DEMOCRACY
DPolity2
Effect on
Polity2 on
Impact (t? t)
Effect on
Polity2 after Three
Years (t  3? t)
Effect on Polity2
after Five Years
(t  5? t)
Effect on Polity2
after Ten Years
(t  10? t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LS GMM LS GMM LS GMM LS GMM
Oil price shock 1.52*** 1.80** 4.47*** 4.68*** 3.34* 4.55** 4.83** 3.77*
(3.34) (2.37) (2.68) (2.83) (1.91) (2.04) (2.06) (1.70)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 4,782 4,782 4,610 4,610 4,390 4,390 3,811 3,811
The method of estimation in columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 is least squares; columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 system-GMM. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at the country
level. The dependent variable is the change in the Polity2 score. Columns 1 and 2 show the effect of an oil price shock in year t on the change in the Polity2 score between year t  1 and t, controlling for the level of
the Polity2 score in year t  1. Columns 3 and 4 show the effect of an oil price shock in year t  3 on the change in the Polity2 score between year t  4 and t, controlling for the level of the Polity2 score in year t  4.
Columns 5 and 6 show the effect of an oil price shock in year t  5 on the change in the Polity2 score between year t  6 and t, controlling for the level of the Polity2 score in year t  6. Columns 7 and 8 show the
effect of an oil price shock in year t  10 on the change in the Polity2 score between year t  11 and t, controlling for the level of the Polity2 score in year t  11. Significantly different from 0 at *90%, **95%,
***99%.
10 Dropping lagged democracy scores yields the following impact
effects (t-statistics): 3.21 (2.55) for Polity2, 0.7 (1.31) for executive con-
straints, 0.93 (2.27) for executive recruitment, and 2.1 (3.37) for political
competition. Hence, the effects continue to be statistically significant
except for executive constraints.
11 Put differently, the discrepancy could be due to shocks with different
degrees of persistence having different effects on democratic institutions.
See Angrist and Pischke (2009) for more on instrumental-variables esti-
mation in the presence of heterogeneous effects.
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should not be an important concern. The table also reports
the p-values of the Hansen test of overidentifying restric-
tion. The Hansen test does not reject the overidentifying
restriction. Table 7, panel B reports the effect of oil price
shocks on democratic institutions conditional on per capita
GDP growth instrumented by lagged GDP levels. The
F-statistic for the first-stage effect of lagged GDP levels on
GDP growth suggests that the instrument is quite strong.
Our results indicate that the (direct) effect of oil price
shocks is statistically insignificant. The effect of GDP
growth conditional on oil price shocks is also statistically
insignificant. One reason could be that the lagged GDP
instrument captures mostly differences in GDP growth due
to mean reversion and that such growth differences have a
weaker or no effect on democratic institutions. Table 8
examines results using lagged savings rates as an instru-
ment for income (Acemoglu et al., 2008).12 Table 8, panel
A reports two-stage least squares estimates where per capita
GDP growth is instrumented by both the change in the sav-
ings rate between t  1 and t  2 and the oil price shock
variable. The first-stage regression yields a joint F-statistic
of around 25, which indicates that weak instruments are
again not a main concern. The effect of per capita GDP
growth on democratic institutions is statistically significant
and similar to our previous results. The Hansen test does
not reject the overidentifying restriction. Table 8, panel B
examines the effect of oil price shocks and per capita
GDP growth separately using the change in the lagged sav-
ings rate as an instrument for GDP growth. The first-stage
F-statistic is now below the Staiger and Stock (1997)
threshold of 10 and indicates that weak instruments are a
concern. As weak instruments can lead to severe biases in
the two-stage least squares standard errors (and derived t-
statistics), we also report the p-values of the Anderson-
Rubin test of statistical significance in brackets. A key
property of this test is robustness to weak instruments.
2SLS standard errors (and derived t-statistics), on the other
hand, are not robust to weak instruments, and inference
based on 2SLS standard errors can be very misleading as a
result. (See Andrews & Stock, 2005, for a review of these
issues.)13 Our results suggest that oil price shocks do not
have a statistically significant (direct) effect on democratic
institutions conditional on GDP growth. The effect of per
capita GDP growth on the Polity2 score and the subscore
for executive recruitment is positive and statistically signifi-
cant at the 90% confidence level according to the Ander-
son-Rubin test but statistically insignificant according to the
t-statistic based on the two-stage least squares standard
errors. The effect of GDP growth on the subscores for
executive constraints and political competition is positive
but statistically insignificant according to the t-statistic
TABLE 8.—OIL PRICE SHOCKS, INCOME, AND DEMOCRACY TEST OF
EXCLUSION RESTRICTION II
DPolity2 DExconst DExrec DPolcomp
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: IV Is Oil Price Shock and Lagged Savings Rate
DLnGDP 5.15*** 1.34** 1.63*** 2.69***
(3.53) (2.51) (3.37) (3.86)
Hansen J, p-value 0.30 0.38 0.17 0.91
First-stage F-statistic 25 25 25 25
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,731 4,731 4,731 4,731
B: IV Is Lagged Savings Rate
Oil price shock 2.26 0.62 1.09 0.13
(0.81) (0.75) (0.99) (0.11)
DLnGDP 10.47 2.79 4.22 3.01
(1.43) (1.28) (1.48) (0.93)
[0.08]* [0.11] [0.08]* [0.30]
First-stage F-statistic 7 7 7 7
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 4,731 4,731 4,731 4,731
The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on
Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. In panel B the p-values in square
brackets are based on the Anderson-Rubin test of statistical significance. A key property of the Anderson-
Rubin test is robustness to weak instruments (see, for example, Andrews & Stock, 2005). The instrumen-
tal variable in panel A is the three-year oil price shock defined as in equation (1) with the ln-change in
oil prices between t and t  3 and the change in the savings rate between t  1 and t  2; in panel B the
instrumental variable is the lagged change in the savings rate between t  1 and t  2. The dependent
variable in column 1 is the change in the Polity2 score; column 2, the change in the executive constraints
score; column 3, the change in the executive recruitment score; and column 4, the change in the political
competition score. The specification in column 1 controls for the Polity2 score at t  1, and the specifica-
tions in columns 24 for the relevant Polity subscore at t  1. Significantly different from 0 at *90%,
**95%, ***99%. When the asterisks are next to the test statistic, the confidence level applies to that test
statistic only.
TABLE 7.—OIL PRICE SHOCKS, INCOME, AND DEMOCRACY TEST OF
EXCLUSION RESTRICTION I
DPolity2 DExconst DExrec DPolcomp
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: IV Is Oil Price Shock and Lagged GDP
DLnGDP 3.97*** 1.10** 1.22** 2.07***
(2.63) (2.16) (2.31) (2.93)
Hansen J, p-value 0.74 0.93 0.85 0.46
First-stage F-statistic 71 71 71 71
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 4,759 4,759 4,759 4,759
B: IV Is Lagged GDP
Three-year oil price shock 0.34 0.03 0.07 0.37
(0.32) (0.09) (0.19) (0.76)
DLnGDP 3.58 1.06 1.14 1.65
(1.45) (1.27) (1.31) (1.44)
First-stage F-statistic 40 40 40 40
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 4,759 4,759 4,759 4,759
The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on
Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The instrumental variable in panel A
is the three-year oil price shock defined as in equation (1) with the ln-change in oil prices between t and
t  3 and the lagged level of real per capita GDP; in panel B the instrumental variable is the lagged level
of real per capita GDP. The dependent variable in column 1 is the change in the Polity2 score; column 2,
the change in the executive constraints score; column 3, the change in the executive recruitment score;
and column 4, the change in the political competition score. The specification in column 1 controls for
the Polity2 score at t  1, and the specifications in columns 2–4 for the relevant Polity subscore at t  1.
Significantly different from 0 at *90%, **95%, ***99%.
12 The savings rate is calculated as 1 minus consumption over GDP
using data from the Penn World Tables.
13 The Anderson-Rubin test also has good power properties (it is a uni-
formly most powerful unbiased test under certain conditions). We imple-
ment a version of the Anderson-Rubin test that is robust to heteroskedasti-
city and arbitrary within-country correlation of the residuals.
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based on the two-stage least squares standard errors and the
Anderson-Rubin test.
C. Further Robustness Checks
International oil prices could be affected by (anticipated)
GDP growth or political change in large producer and con-
sumer countries. Table 9 therefore presents two-stage least
squares effects of GDP growth on democratic institutions in
countries that produce or consume less than 1% percent of
world oil production.14 (Anticipated) GDP growth or politi-
cal change in these countries is unlikely to have significant
effects on international oil prices. The estimates in table 9
show that oil-price-driven GDP shocks continue to have a
statistically significant effect on democratic institutions.
The size of the effects is similar to our previous results
except for executive constraints.
It is sometimes maintained that upturns in international
oil prices are bad for economic and political development
in countries where oil exports are an important share of
GDP (Friedman, 2006, 2008). Table 10 examines this view
after restricting the sample to countries that are net oil
exporters. The effect of oil-price-driven per capita GDP
growth on democratic institutions continues to be positive
and statistically significant, and point estimates are some-
what larger than in previous tables. Table 11 examines
whether the effect of oil-price-driven GDP growth on
democratic institutions is significantly different in OPEC
countries. The difference between the effect in OPEC coun-
tries and in non-OPEC countries is captured by the interac-
tion effect. This effect enters positively but is statistically
insignificant.15
In table 12 we split the sample into two subperiods with
a similar number of observations. Panel A presents two-
stage least squares estimates for the pre-1987 period, and
panel B shows estimates for the post-1987 period. Oil price
shocks have a statistically significant effect on per capita
GDP in both samples. The effect of oil-price-driven GDP
growth on the Polity2 score is also statistically significant
in both samples. The point estimates for the Polity2 score
are similar: 2.60 before 1987 and 2.57 after 1987. The
results for Polity subscores are stronger for the post-1987
period.
Table 13 estimates the effect of oil-price-driven GDP
growth on democratic institutions for the period after 1970.
The value for net oil exports over GDP used in the oil price
shock in equation (1) now corresponds to the beginning of
the sample period (1970) to preclude any effect of interna-
TABLE 10.—ROBUSTNESS II: OIL EXPORTERS ONLY
DPolity2 DExconst DExrec DPolcomp
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DLnGDP 6.91* 2.27* 2.01* 3.65**
(1.95) (1.77) (1.75) (2.38)
First-stage F-statistic 22 22 22 22
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1,518 1,518 1,518 1,518
The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on
Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The instrumental variable is the
three-year oil price shock defined as in equation (1) with the ln-change in oil prices between t and t  3.
The dependent variable in column 1 is the change in the Polity2 score; column 2, the change in the
executive constraints score; column 3, the change in the executive recruitment score; and column 4, the
change in the political competition score. The oil-exporting countries are Albania, Algeria, Angola,
Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bolivia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya,
Malaysia, Mexico, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Qatar, Republic of Congo,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates,
United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Yemen. The specification in column 1 controls
for the Polity2 score at t  1, and the specifications in columns 2–4 for the relevant Polity subscore at t –
1. Significantly different from 0 at *90%, **95%, *** 99%.
TABLE 11.—ROBUSTNESS III: IS THE STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIP
DIFFERENT FOR OPEC?
DPolity2 DExconst DExrec DPolcomp
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DLnGDP 3.30*** 0.53 1.12*** 2.31***
(2.83) (1.05) (2.77) (3.07)
DLnGDP* 1.43 0.74 0.24 0.37
OPEC (1.11) (1.32) (0.70) (0.60)
First-stage F-statistic 15 15 15 15
Marginal effect in
OPEC oil exporters
4.73*** 1.27** 1.36*** 2.68***
(3.20) (2.16) (3.03) (3.97)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 4,782 4,782 4,782 4,782
The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on
Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The instrumental variable is the
three-year oil price shock defined as in equation (1) with the ln-change in oil prices between t and t  3
and the three-year oil price shock interacted with an indicator variable that is 1 if and only if a country is
part of OPEC. The countries that are part of OPEC are Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. The dependent vari-
able in column 1 is the change in the Polity2 score; column 2, the change in the executive constraints
score; column 3, the change in the executive recruitment score; and column 4, the change in the political
competition score. The specification in column 1 controls for the Polity2 score at t  1, and the specifica-
tions in columns 2–4 for the relevant Polity subscore at t  1. Significantly different from 0 at *90%,
**95%, ***99%. When the asterisks are next to the test statistic, the confidence level applies to that test
statistic only.
TABLE 9.—ROBUSTNESS I: EXCLUDING MAJOR OIL PRODUCERS AND OIL CONSUMERS
DPolity2 DExconst DExrec DPolcomp
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DLnGDP 4.05** 0.28 1.60*** 2.95***
(2.63) (0.36) (2.84) (3.44)
First-stage F-statistic 21 21 21 21
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 3,957 3,957 3,957 3,957
The meethod of estimation is two-stage least squares. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on
Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The instrumental variable is the
three-year oil price shock defined as in equation (1) in the main text with the ln-change in oil prices
between t and t  3. The dependent variable in column 1 is the change in the Polity2 score; column 2,
the change in the executive constraints score; column 3, the change in the executive recruitment score;
and column 4, the change in the political competition score. Excluded countries are those that produce or
consume more than 1% of world oil production: Algeria, Canada, China, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Italy, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, The Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. The specification in column 1
controls for the Polity2 score at t  1, and the specifications in columns 2–4 for the relevant Polity sub-
score at t  1. Significantly different from 0 at *90%, **95%, ***99%.
14 The excluded countries according to the 1% criterion are Algeria,
Canada, China, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Kuwait, Libya,
Mexico, The Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and Vene-
zuela.
15 The first-stage effect of oil price shocks on GDP per capita for the
OPEC oil exporters has a t-value of 7.6 while the first-stage effect for the
remaining countries hast a t-value of 5.3.
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tional oil price fluctuations after 1970 on our measure of
oil exports.16 Oil-price-driven GDP growth continues to
have a significantly positive effect on democratic institu-
tions, except for executive constraints.
Oil-price-driven GDP growth could lead to improve-
ments in Polity2 scores because it increases the probability
of countries’ transiting from autocracy to democracy (a
democratic transition) or because it decreases the probabil-
ity of countries’ transiting from democracy to autocracy (an
autocratic reversal). Table 14, column 1 shows that oil-
price-driven GDP growth has a significantly positive effect
on the probability of democratic transitions. A 1% increase
in real per capita GDP due to oil price shocks increases the
probability of a democratic transition by around 0.4 percen-
tage points. Column 2 shows that oil-price-driven GDP
growth also decreases the probability of autocratic rever-
sals. But the point estimate is not statistically significant,
even though it is larger than the point estimate on the prob-
ability of a transition to democracy.17 Column 3 shows that
oil-price-driven GDP growth continues to have a significant
effect on changes in the Polity2 variable when we include
interregnum periods. And column 4 shows that there is also
a significant effect of oil-price-driven GDP growth on the
discretized Polity IV Regtrans variable.
All estimates so far were based on the democracy mea-
sures from the Polity IV project. Table 15 reports two-stage
least squares estimates for alternative democracy measures.
TABLE 13.—ROBUSTNESS V: USING NET-EXPORT SHARES IN 1970 AND
RESTRICTING THE SAMPLE TO POST-1970
DPolity2 DExconst DExrec DPolcomp
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DLnGDP 2.55** 0.15 0.93*** 1.90***
(2.54) (0.23) (2.89) (3.92)
First-stage F-statistic 59 59 59 59
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 3,390 3,390 3,390 3,390
The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on
Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The instrumental variable is the
three-year oil price shock defined as in equation (1) with the ln-change in oil prices between t and t  3.
The dependent variable in column 1 is the change in the Polity2 score; column 2, the change in the
executive constraints score; column 3, the change in the executive recruitment score; and column 4, the
change in the political competition score. The specification in column 1 controls for the Polity2 score at
t  1, and the specifications in columns 2–4 for the relevant Polity subscore at t  1. Significantly differ-
ent from 0 at *90%, **95%, ***99%.
TABLE 15.—ROBUSTNESS VII: ALTERNATIVE DEMOCRACY INDICATORS
DPolitical
Rights
DFH
Indicator
Przeworski
et al. (2000)
Papaioannou
and Siourounis
(2008b)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DLnGDP 1.92*** 0.78** 0.26*** 0.14***
(3.54) (1.98) (2.64) (2.71)
First-stage F-statistic 34 34 31 29
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of
observations
4,263 4,263 4,573 4,660
The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on
Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The instrumental variable is the three-
year oil price shock defined as in equation (1) with the ln-change in oil prices between t and t  3. The
dependent variable in column 1 is the change in the Freedom House political rights score. The political
rights score ranges between 1 and 7 and is rescaled so that larger scores denote more democratic institu-
tions. The dependent variable in column 2 is the change in the Freedom House trichotomous freedom indi-
cator. The freedom indicator is rescaled so that larger values denote more democratic institutions. The
dependent variable in column 4 is the change in the democracy indicator from Przeworski et al. (2000);
column 4, the change in the democracy indicator from Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b). The specifi-
cation in column 1 controls for the political rights score at t 1, the specification in column 2 for the Free-
dom House trichotomous freedom indicator at t 1, the specification in column 3 for the Przeworski et al.
(2000) democracy indicator at t 1, and the specification in column 4 for the Papaioannou and Siourounis
(2008b) democracy indicator at t 1. Significantly different from 0 at *90%, **95%, ***99%.
TABLE 12.—ROBUSTNESS IV: TIME-PERIOD SAMPLE SPLIT
DPolity2 DExconst DExrec DPolcomp
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: Pre-1987 Period
DLnGDP 2.60* 0.73 0.64 1.50**
(1.87) (1.35) (1.50) (2.27)
First-stage F-statistic 61 61 61 61
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 2,419 2,419 2,419 2,419
B: Post-1987 Period
DLnGDP 2.57** 0.04 0.98* 2.33**
(1.96) (0.07) (1.93) (2.54)
First-stage F-statistic 22 22 22 22
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 2,363 2,363 2,363 2,363
The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on
Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The instrumental variable is the
three-year oil price shock defined as in equation (1) with the ln-change in oil prices between t and t  3.
The dependent variable in column 1 is the change in the Polity2 score; column 2, the change in the
executive constraints score; column 3, the change in the executive recruitment score; and column 4, the
change in the political competition score. The specification in column 1 controls for the Polity2 score at
t  1, and the specifications in columns 2–4 for the relevant Polity subscore at t  1. Significantly differ-
ent from 0 at *90%, **95%, ***99%.
TABLE 14.—ROBUSTNESS VI: INCLUDING INTERREGNUM PERIODS AND
USING TRANSITION INDICATORS
Democratic
Transition
Autocratic
Reserval DPolity2 DRegtrans
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DLnGDP 0.36*** 0.57 3.80** 0.70*
(2.72) (1.52) (2.62) (1.89)
First-stage F-statistic 38 12 48 48
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 2,649 2,371 5,020 5,020
The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. t-statistics shown in parentheses are based on
Huber-robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The instrumental variable is the
three-year oil price shock defined as in equation (1) with the ln-change in oil prices between t and t  3.
The dependent variable in column 1 is a democratic transition indicator that takes on the value of 1 in
year t if the country is a democracy conditional on being an autocracy in t  1. The dependent variable
in column 2 is an autocratic reversal indicator that takes on the value of 1 if the country is an autocracy
in year t conditional on being a democracy in t  1. The dependent variable in column 3 is the change in
the Polity2 score when including interregnum (anarchy) periods and transition periods that are associated
with interregnum. The dependent variable in column 4 is the change in the regime transition indicator
that is 1 if the country experiences democratic improvements according to the Polity IV Regtrans vari-
able (i.e., a 3 or more points increase in the Polity2 score over three years or less); 1 if the country
experiences democratic deteriorations (a 3 or more points decrease in the Polity2 score over three years
or less); or 0. The specification in column 3 controls for the Polity2 score at t  1 and the specification in
column 4 for the Regtrans at t  1. Significantly different from 0 at *90%, **95%, ***99%.
16 Using average net exports over GDP after 1970 instead yields quanti-
tatively and statistically stronger results.
17 The linear probability model is the usually preferred method in
instrumental variables estimation (see Angrist & Krueger, 2001). To
ensure that results are not driven by the linear probability specification,
we have also estimated reduced-form transition equations using the condi-
tional logit fixed-effects estimator. These also yield a significant positive
effect of oil price shocks on the probability of a transition to democracy
and a negative but insignificant effect of oil price shocks on the probabil-
ity of a transition to autocracy.
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Column 1 reports the two-stage least squares effect of per
capita GDP growth on the political rights score from Free-
dom House (2010). Column 2 reports the effect on the Free-
dom House trichotomous freedom indicator. Column 3
reports the effect on the Przeworski et al. (2000) binary
democracy indicator, and column 4 reports the effect on the
democracy indicator from Papaioannou and Siourounis
(2008b). The main result is that oil-price-driven GDP
growth leads to democratic improvements in all cases.
Table 16 uses constant-price GDP per capita growth data
from the WDI (2010) instead of purchasing-power-parity
GDP data from the Penn World Tables. The WDI data are
entirely based on national income accounts and do not
account for cross-country differences in prices (see Heston
et al., 2009). Using WDI instead of Penn World Tables data
on GDP growth leads to a drop in sample size of around
10%. Moreover, the first-stage F-statistics drop below 10,
which indicates that weak instruments are a concern accord-
ing to the Staiger and Stock (1997) criterion. We therefore
report the p-values of the Anderson-Rubin test of statistical
significance in brackets in addition to the t-statistics based
on two-stage least squares standard errors. Table 16 shows
that oil-price-driven per capita GDP growth continues to
have a statistically significant positive effect on the Polity2
score at the 90% confidence level. For the democracy indi-
cator from Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b), the effect
is positive but statistically insignificant according to the
Anderson-Rubin test and the t-statistic based on the two-
stage least squares standard error. For the other democracy
indicators, the effects are positive and statistically signifi-
cant at the 90% level according to the Anderson-Rubin test
but statistically insignificant according to the t-statistic
based on the two-stage least squares standard errors.
V. Conclusion
Upturns in international oil prices raise GDP growth
more in countries with greater net oil exports over GDP,
and the implied growth differentials are very persistent.
These economic effects of international oil price fluctua-
tions lead us to ask two main questions. How do upturns in
international oil prices affect democratic institutions? And
what is the effect of oil-price-driven (persistent) income
shocks on democracy? We find that countries with greater
net oil exports over GDP see improvements in democratic
institutions following upturns in international oil prices. An
oil-price-driven 1 percentage point increase in per capita
GDP growth leads to an improvement in the main Polity
democracy score by around 0.2 percentage points on impact
and by around 2 percentage points in the long run. The
effect on the probability of a democratic transition is around
0.4 percentage points.
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TABLE 16.—ROBUSTNESS VIII: WORLD BANK GDP DATA
DPolity2
DPolitical
Rights
DFH
Indicator
Przeworski
et al. (2000)
Papaioannou and
Siourounis (2008b)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DLnGDP 9.82 5.58 2.90 0.89 0.32
(1.31) (1.78)* (1.49) (1.59) (1.29)
[0.07]* [0.00]*** [0.01]*** [0.05]** [0.12]
First-stage F-statistic 8 8 8 9 7
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 4,507 3,852 3,852 4,029 4,154
The method of estimation is two-stage least squares. The p-values in square brackets are based on the Anderson-Rubin test of statistical significance. A key property of the Anderson-Rubin test is robustness to
weak instruments (see, for example, Andrews & Stock, 2005). The instrumental variable is the three-year oil price shock defined as in equation (1) with the ln-change in oil prices between t and t  3. The dependent
variable in column 1 is the change in the Polity2 score. The range of the Polity2 score is between 10 and 10 (larger values denote more democratic institutions). The dependent variable in column 2 is the change in
the Freedom House political rights score. The political rights score ranges between 1 and 7 and is rescaled so that larger scores denote more democratic institutions. The dependent variable in column 3 is the change
in the Freedom House trichotomous freedom indicator. The freedom indicator is rescaled so that larger values denote more democratic institutions. The dependent variable in column 4 is the change in the democracy
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for the Przeworski et al. (2000) democracy indicator at t  1, and the specification in column 5 for the Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b) democracy indicator at t  1. Significantly different from 0 at *90%,
**95%, ***99%.
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